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As its name suggests, Evolutionary Phonology (EP; Blevins 2004) finds parallels 
in evolutionary biology. Blevins makes several mentions of Darwinian principles 
such as adaptation and in many cases utilizes language and reasoning that would 
not seem out of place in the evolutionary biology literature. However, she 
cautions that parallels to Darwin are necessarily “largely metaphorical” because 
phonological systems are learned, not transmitted in the DNA (xi). Here I think 
Blevins gives herself too little credit. Salikoko Mufwene (2001 et seq.) has made 
convincing arguments that languages can and should be viewed as species, with 
idiolects parallel to individual organisms, and that “[this] approach is analogical 
only to the extent that it is inspired by scholarship on biological evolution” 
(Mufwene 2005: 30). Certainly, the evolutionary jargon Blevins applies to 
linguistics is no more metaphorical than other such terms already in wide use, 
such as “genetic relatedness.” Elsewhere, such as in chapter 2’s discussion of 
adaptation, the correct parallels with biology are less obviously helpful, as 
Blevins notes. She speaks of multiple dimensions of adaptativeness — one for 
ease of acquisition, one for ease of articulation, and one for ease of communi-
cation — but downplays the roles of adaptation, non-aptation, and disaptation in 
sound change. Probing this further could provide an interesting avenue of 
research; one gets the feeling that the story here may not be a simple one. 
 The fundamental tenets of EP resonate with arguments made by the 
Neogrammarians, Otto Jespersen, Joseph Greenberg, and particularly Baudouin 
de Courtenay. These founding fathers of phonology were adamant that syn-
chronic sound systems are best understood through the changes that produce 
them. Blevins also espouses this principle but differs from the tradition by 
rejecting teleology in sound change. For her, the only goal-directed processes that 
interact with pure phonological change are morphological analogy and the 
pressure to preserve paradigms where adhering to a regular sound change 
would cause paradigmatic contrasts to collapse. The elimination of teleology 
from phonology provides one way in which EP differs from the currently 
dominant paradigm in synchronic phonology, Optimality Theory (OT; Prince & 
Smolensky 1993). 
 EP and OT also clash in another closely related domain, namely how the 
relative frequencies of various sound patterns should be explained. In OT, 





constraints on synchronic grammars and cross-linguistically fixed rankings of 
such constraints serve to create a markedness hierarchy. The more marked a 
sound pattern, the rarer it will be. In contrast, EP treats markedness as an 
epiphenomenon — an E-language concept belonging strictly to the domain of 
performance, not competence. Under this conception of phonology, because 
some sound changes are rare, the synchronic patterns created by those changes 
will also be rare. Another reason why some sound patterns are rare is that 
multiple independent sound changes must occur sequentially in order for those 
patterns to arise. Patterns formed by common changes or sets thereof will occur 
at a higher frequency than patterns necessitating rarer chains of events. Thus, the 
work done by synchronic constraints in OT instead falls upon the language 
acquisition mechanism, which itself drives phonological change. Understanding 
diachronic phonology thus requires synthesizing research from such disparate 
domains as phonetics, auditory perception, language acquisition, typology, 
dialectal/idiolectal variation, experimental phonology, and phonological theory. 
 Apart from simply making use of diachronic phonology to explain 
synchronic patterns, Blevins also proposes a new model of sound change itself. 
All phonetically-motivated sound change falls into one (or more) of three 
categories in the ‘three-C’ model of EP: CHANGE, CHANCE, and CHOICE. The first 
of these, CHANGE, covers the range of cases in which a learner mishears an 
utterance and treats it as a token of a different but perceptually similar utterance. 
An example of CHANGE that Blevins gives is the sequence /anpa/ being 
misinterpreted as /ampa/ due to the weakness of the cues indicating the place of 
the pre-consonantal nasal. 
 CHANCE changes are those in which the hearer reconstructs an underlying 
representation of an inherently ambiguous signal which differs from that of the 
speaker. A hypothetical instance of CHANCE would involve [÷a ≥÷] being analyzed 
as /÷a/, /a÷/, /÷a ≥÷/, or /a ≥/, provided this representation differs from what the 
speaker has in mind. Frequency guides the analysis, so less frequent sequences 
are less likely to be posited as underlying forms. Language-specific constraints, 
which themselves must be learned in the EP model, may also come into play 
here, though I do not see how the phonologist (or the child) can determine when 
to posit a constraint and when doing so would be redundant restatement of a 
generalization better left as emergent. The Feature–to–Segment Mapping 
Principle, a property of the acquisition process with OCP-like effects, also affects 
CHANCE, leading the learner to assume a single source for a single phonetic 
feature, disadvantaging a multiple-source analysis like /÷a ≥÷/. The result of 
CHANCE is imperceptible, entailing no immediate change in pronunciation.  
CHOICE, in contrast, produces tiny shifts in pronunciation akin to those 
documented in the Labovian tradition. When there are multiple variants of an 
utterance in circulation and the hearer adopts a phonological representation or 
“best exemplar” that differs from the speaker’s, this is an instance of CHOICE. 
Upon hearing [kka'ta] in alternation with [ka°ka'ta] and [kakata], a listener could 
assume underlying /kka'ta/ and an epenthesis rule, rather than the speaker’s 
underlying /kakata/ with a vowel shortening/deletion rule. In none of these 
three types of sound change do we see ease of articulation or ease of pronun-
ciation directly influencing the direction of change. Instead, like markedness, 





these are taken to be emergent properties. 
 EP’s three-C model of sound change feels intuitive in some respects. It is 
hard to argue that something very much like CHANCE, CHANGE, and CHOICE do 
not play any role in sound change. However, it is less clear that they are the only 
players: Explaining how these mishearings of individual words eventually 
explain Neogrammarian-style exceptionless sound change would not be a trivial 
task. It is not enough simply to say that completed sound changes undergo 
lexical diffusion (p. 260). Nor is it readily apparent that distinguishing among 
these particular three categories elucidates anything. There seems little hope of 
ascertaining which C has operated to produce a specific change, either a priori or 
in practice. And if this cannot be done, then the categories are deprived of utility 
or individual character.  
Another dichotomy emphasized in the book, the distinction between 
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ or ‘crazy’ phonology, could use clarification. On several 
occasions Blevins switches between discussion of unnatural rule types and 
unnatural sound patterns, which are quite separate matters. A strange historical 
development can in theory give rise to a well-behaved synchronic system, just as 
one or more natural phonological changes in the history of a language can 
produce sound patterns that seem unusual. In section 3.1 we are told that “this 
contrast [between natural and unnatural rule types — BS] is central to 
Evolutionary Phonology” (p. 71), but this thread is left dangling and a few pages 
later we are led to the conclusion that distinguishing between natural and 
unnatural sound patterns “seems unwarranted and indeed misguided” (p. 78). 
This is indeed a coherent position insofar as rules (be they diachronic or syn-
chronic) and sound patterns can be divorced, but the discussion could perhaps 
benefit from making the discussions of synchronic and diachronic naturalness 
explicitly distinct. 
 In many ways, EP represents an original research program and makes 
predictions that differ from those made by previous theories of synchronic and 
diachronic phonology. Nevertheless, in at least one respect, it runs into familiar 
problems faced by other models. The EP theory of chain shifting largely 
resembles the one put forward by William Labov (1994), for better or for worse. 
Both make use of exemplar theory to advance sound change, and both take the 
gradualness of sound change and the continuousness of the vowel space 
seriously. I quote below from a summary of EP position on chain shifting: 
 
Vocalic chain shifts are the combined result of intrinsic variation with the 
prototype structure of vocalic categories. Chain shifts can arise naturally 
when a formerly occupied area of the psycho-acoustic space is opened up, 
with variation giving rise to better prototypes of a pre-existing category in 
the newly opened space.               (Blevins 2004: 291) 
 
Such a model fails to account for any shift in which one vowel moves anywhere 
other than the midway point between its neighbors, as must happen in the 
“encroachment” commonly thought to cause push chains. These limitations fall 
naturally out of the particular type of exemplar theory that Blevins adopts. 
 The basis of Blevins’ mechanism is Pierrehumbert’s (2001) exemplar-based 
model of perception, which EP uses to account for production facts as well. In 





this model, when a speaker wants to produce a vowel — [u], for the sake of 
argument — he attempts to produce the “best” exemplar of [u] that he has heard. 
Crucially, “best” in this context means most likely to be categorized as [u]. This 
statistic, Pierrehumbert claims, comes from the exemplar’s summed similarity to 
other exemplars of [u] taken as a fraction of its summed similarity to exemplars 
of all vowels. Now the other members of the vowel system become critical. As a 
test case, consider a five-vowel system of /i, e, a, o, u/. In this vowel space, [u]’s 
only close neighbor is [o]. There are no vowels higher or more back than [u], and 
[i] is distinguished from [u] by its lack of rounding in addition to its frontness. 
Because of the structure of the system, the best exemplars of [u] according to the 
rubric would in fact be closer to the edge of the vowel space than the mean 
exemplar of the [u] category, because these exemplars would be least confusable 
with [o]. Blevins translates this perceptual effect to production by stipulating that 
speakers try to produce the best exemplar of a given category. This feedback loop 
of perception and production has the effect of distributing vowels evenly 
throughout the perceptual space, because the system will reach equilibrium only 
when the best exemplar of each category is also its mean. 
 Since [u] is closer in the perceptual space to [o] than it is to [i], this type of 
mechanism can easily model how /u/ would begin to front. One would in fact 
expect this fronting to happen in every vowel system in which [i] is not the 
nearest neighbor to [u]. This may explain why /u/ exhibits some degree of 
fronting in a wide variety of languages and dialects. More problematic, and 
indeed impossible to explain using solely the “best exemplar” theory of sound 
change, is ascertaining why /u/ would front all the way to [y] rather than 
stopping at the point maximally distant from both [i] and [o]. 
 The model runs into the same problem when explaining the intermediate 
steps of a push chain, because such shifts would require encroachment. In other 
words, because vowels must always move away from one another in this model, 
it cannot account for situations in which /o…/ raises (almost) to [u…] prior to the 
fronting of /u…/ to [y…], but it can account for situations in which /u…/ fronts and 
then /o…/ later raises. Blevins unequivocally states that “it is the earlier shift of u… 
> y… which allows [u…] to be a potentially better exemplar of /o…/ than [o…] itself” 
(p. 288). This seems to predict that no chains with the same steps but opposite 
chronological sequence would occur. Chains involving /u…/-fronting and /o…/-
raising are actually quite common, appearing so frequently in the world’s 
languages that Labov (1994) treats them as a distinct category (his “Pattern III”). 
Though the literature typically calls these rephonologizations “push chains,” 
they clearly constitute drag chains if they occurred in the order for which Blevins 
has an explanation. Only establishing chronologies for these shifts through 
independent means can tell us whether they confirm Blevins’ implicit prediction 
or not (see Samuels 2006). If the prediction is correct and /u/-fronting always 
precedes /o/-raising where it occurs, as long as there is some other way to spell 
out why /u/ fronts all the way to /y/, Labov’s Pattern III shifts can be 
explained. 
Though I have highlighted some of the shortcomings of the EP approach 
here, I feel it represents an important contribution to the field, one that bridges 
the synchronic and diachronic admirably. The book is lucidly written, well 





organized, and clear in its aims. EP follows in the tradition of classic work in the 
field, but it is different enough from previous approaches — especially OT, the 
current favorite — to warrant further refinement and scrutiny. Much could be 
gained from pursuing this line of research. If Blevins is correct that markedness 
should not be represented in the competence system, this would have far-
reaching consequences for synchronic phonological theory. This is an empirically 
testable hypothesis: To the extent that markedness-based accounts of phono-
logical phenomena can be explained otherwise, EP finds support. Similarly, the 
status of processes like final voicing is critical here; whether they are impossible 
or just vanishingly rare makes all the difference for the theory. Surely the last 
word on all these matters remains to be said, but EP provides a fine place from 
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